Since 2000-the dusk of the Milosevic-era-three successive Serbian governments, the Djindjic, Zivkovic and Kostunica administrations, have amassed an inconsistent and oscillating record of (non)compliance with EU and US conditionality for full cooperation with the International Criminal Tribunal on the Former Yugoslavia (ICTY). How do we explain this changing pattern of compliance and noncompliance by Serbia? This paper contends that international rules and norms which attempt far-reaching institutional and social change, such as ICTY conditionality in Serbia, will likely elicit a historical process that is multidimensional and diachronic, more politically complex than the parsimony suggested by incentives-based, model-driven theorizing. The paper argues for a more contextual and practice-oriented approach to the study of compliance politics; focusing on how material, normative and temporal dimensions interact historically to form particular compliance processes & outcomes. The empirical section uses inductive process-tracing to make a temporal reconstruction of the process and experience of Serbian (non)compliance with ICTY conditionality during the last Kostunica government; focusing on the interaction between three dimensions of compliance politics: (1) strategic calculation; (2) identity & cultural resonance; and (3) temporality.
A rational-consequentialist approach frames compliance politics as a matter of getting the incentives and punishment right relative to "domestic adoption costs" (Schimmelfennig and Sedelmeier, 2004 & Schimmelfennig et al., 2003) . In this way, compliance problems are reduced to the following bargaining model: even when determinate and credible prescriptions are combined with substantial rewards or punishment, the size of domestic adoption costs and their distribution among domestic actors are likely to determine whether prescriptions are accepted or rejected (Schimmelfennig and Sedelmeier, 2004: 674) . As a result, incidents of Serbian noncompliance are explained as outcomes where the domestic political costs of complying with prescriptions proved prohibitively high relative to the rewards, or even the sanctions, on offer; with the vice-versa holding true for cases of compliance. This paper, however, questions the insight of the above model in the case of ICTY conditionality and (non)compliance in Serbia. I argue that the nature of compliance sought, in terms of the quality of the rules and norms prescribed, greatly influences the extent to which a rational-consequentialist approach can explain the politics of compliance with respect to both process and outcome. In particular, I contend that prescribed rules and norms (the compliance project), which attempt far-reaching institutional and social change, such as ICTY conditionality in Serbia, will elicit a historical process that is multidimensional and more politically complex than the parsimony suggested by a rationalist model.
To probe this claim, I perform a temporal reconstruction of the process of Serbian This period of history, I argue, provides a useful glimpse at how an incentives-based, model-driven approach is explanatively constrained when dealing with the problematique of ICTY compliance. Specifically, the approach downplays the importance of normative and temporal aspects, which together with material incentives form the contextual gestalt of the Serbian case. In the alternative, I argue, we need to develop a more contextual way of studying compliance politics beyond the monological limitations of model-driven and rationalist-inspired theorizing; approaches which reveal the unique material, normative and temporal dimensions of compliance politics and practice.
The analysis that follows therefore is structured into five parts. In the first two sections, I review and critique the 'modellised' approach which has been the foundation for the study of compliance politics thus far, and has largely served rational-consequentialist theorizing.
Next, I present a short outline on how a more contextual approach might develop as an alternative to model-driven theorizing; touching upon key (meta)theoretical and methodological aspects. Subsequently, I use inductive process-tracing to follow the sequential history of ICTY compliance in Serbia during the Kostunica government; focusing on the interaction between three dimensions of compliance politics: (1) strategic calculation; (2) identity and cultural resonance; and (3) temporality. Finally, I summarize the findings of my process-tracing and discuss its implications for our understanding of compliance theory and practice.
Is Compliance merely about getting the Incentives and Punishment Right?
At first glance, there may appear to be little to puzzle over regarding inconsistent Serbian compliance with ICTY prescriptions. Scholars of Euro-Atlantic enlargement have typically proposed the logics of consequentialism and appropriateness (March & Olsen, 1998 as stylized rationalist versus constructivist answers to the puzzle of how and to what extent Euro-Atlantic institutions have promoted domestic change within accession or target states?
In this way, the enlargement scholarship can be said to generally cluster around two poles of interpretation. The first pole emphasizes the manipulation of material incentives as crucial for the adoption of Euro-Atlantic norms and rules (Long, 1996; Hopkins, 1997; Pridham, 2002; Hughes & Sasse, 2003; Schimmelfennig et al., 2003; Schimmelfennig & Sedelmeier, 2004 Kelley, 2004 Kelley, & 2005 Schimmelfennig, 2005) . The second pole proposes alternatively that normative suasion and/or interaction are salient for changing the substantive beliefs of target leaders and target societies (Ikenberry & Kupchan, 1990; Johnston, 2001; Manners, 2002; Checkel, 2005; Flockhart, 2006) . The former approach however has traveled furthest within the scholarship through persistent advocacy, and hence become a kind of 'orthodoxy' for compliance thinking and theorizing. Therefore the aim of what follows is not to provide a sweeping review of the literature as a whole but rather critique the general 'conditionality' approach which has gained sway over the 'mainstream'
field.
As noted above, mainstream theory on Euro-Atlantic enlargement is characterized by a rational-consequentialist approach that reduces rule and norm compliance to the following function: faced with the proper incentives and/or punishment, state agents are suppose to engage in cost/benefit calculations that lead them to align domestic policy with international rules and norms (Checkel, 2000: 4) . Indeed, many rationalists are likely to protest at such an austere categorization by pointing to their professed commitment to bi-or 'multi-causality' and how fuzzy 'variables', such as norms, persuasion or legitimacy, have also been incorporated into research designs. However, the forthright truth, I claim, is that while many rationalists speak loudly about intellectual evenhandedness, in the end their rationalist understanding of human behaviour obstructs-whether expressly or implicitly-any meaningful interpretation of how culture, norms and identity play a significant and constitutive role in the process of Euro-Atlantic enlargement; thereby leaving material forces as the a priori and 'dominant' explanatory factor.
Rationalist approaches obfuscate the social in different ways and do so at the levels of theoretical specification and analytical application (Reus-Smit, 2002) . What is common to most rationalist scholars is that they acknowledge the importance of 'normative' factors, yet subsequently circumscribe the significance of that concession by delimiting the role of norms and emphasizing exogenous 'material interests' as the real engines of political action.
In this way, an artificial and stylized barrier is placed between 'norms' and 'material interests' such that profound appreciation is lost vis-à-vis how 'norms' influence the constitution of actor identities and interests. It is a dichotomy grounded upon the false assumption that 'material incentives' and 'norms' can be characterized as discrete or adversarial 'mechanisms'; which in turn leaves no prospect for any meaningful and practical understanding of how cultural context and social identity influence the process of enlargement-other than as a 'constraint' or strategic "switchman" a la Weber (Weber, 1948: 280) .
How the dichotomy between incentives and norms is formulated varies from scholar to scholar: some have made the separation explicit by casting essentialized definitions of 'normative influence' and 'material suasion' into discrete and adversarial 'models'; while others have employed a more subterranean approach, stressing the rhetoric of bi-or 'multicausality' but yet privileging the force of material incentives. The works of Frank Schimmelfennig and Ulrich Sedelmeier (Schimmelfennig & Sedelmeier, 2004 and Judith G. Kelley (Kelley, 2004 (Kelley, & 2005 exemplify these two discursive strategies in the rationalist literature. Both contributions advocate the effectiveness of 'conditionality' over variously defined socialization 'mechanisms'; however Schimmelfennig and Sedelmeier employ explicit contending models, while Kelly invokes the language of bi-causality. In the end, the noted differences are more a matter of form as opposed to substance as, I argue, their desire to privilege or test one idealized 'variable' over another reveals a profound misunderstanding of how entangled materialism and cultural legitimacy are in the process of enlargement: 'norms' mattered for more than the 'sweet talk' and rhetorical pressure exerted by Euro-Atlantic officials; 'the Return to Europe' defined how accession states identified with and construed the benefit of the European project as a whole.
In to encapsulate this process, positing that target actors are "strategic utility-maximizers interested in the maximization of their own power and welfare (Schimmelfennig & Sedelmeier, 2004: 671) ." Further, they hold, the main factor conditioning target state 'choice' is how incentives of 'the bargaining structure' affect the "domestic equilibrium" of preferences and bargaining process in domestic society.
The central proposition of Schimmelfennig and Sedelmeier's EIM is that a target state adopts external prescriptions if the benefits of incentives exceed the 'domestic adoption costs'. The authors approximate this cost-benefit calculation based on the following factors/mechanisms: "(i) the determinacy of conditions, (ii) the size and speed of rewards, (iii) the credibility of threats and promises, and (iv) the size of adoption costs (Schimmelfennig & Sedelmeier, 2004: 672) ." From these factors, discrete hypotheses are formulated to ascertain the effectiveness of "rule transfer." For example, the "rewards" hypothesis provides that: "the effectiveness of rule transfer increases with the size and speed of rewards." Regarding "adoption costs", the model hypothesizes that: "the likelihood of rule adoption decreases with the number of veto players incurring the net adoption costs (opportunity costs, welfare and power losses) from compliance (Schimmelfennig & Sedelmeier, 2004: 675) ."
Alongside the EIM, Schimmelfennig and Sedelmeier consider alternate 'models' of 'behavioural' change informed by approaches such as 'social learning' and 'lesson-drawing'.
Each model is furnished with contending hypotheses intended to reveal and test noninstrumental 'mechanisms' of compliance. For instance, the general proposition of the 'social learning model' is that: "a state adopts EU rules if it is persuaded of the appropriateness of EU rules (Schimmelfennig & Sedelmeier, 2004: 675) ." However, due to the author's model-driven design, these non-instrumental processes are effectively relegated to the function of 'control mechanisms': to identify whether, in a particular context, noninstrumental processes have superseded the "dominant' logic of strategic bargaining.
Hence, in this way, and as Schimmelfennig and Sedelmeier reveal themselves, incentives become privileged in large part because of the manner in which the authors' frame the inquiry, as an essential choice between discrete models of representation:
"These models [i.e. external incentives and social learning] are not necessarily mutually exclusive; they may be partly competing, partly complementary explanations. But we can ask whether there is a dominant model that explains effective rule transfer from the EU to the CEECs.
[…] The main finding of this project is that rule transfer from the EU to the CEECs and the variation in its effectiveness are best explained according to the external incentives model and in particular with the credibility of EU conditionality and the domestic costs of rule adoption (Schimmelfennig & Sedelmeier, 2004: 671) ."
In Ethnic Politics in Europe (2005) , Judith Kelly entertains-what I claim is-a similar incentives versus socialization dynamic in her study of how the OSCE, the CE and the EU influenced ethnic minority policy in Latvia, Estonia, Slovakia, and Romania; however she articulates her research design in a more subtle and less adversarial manner. Kelley looks at how two distinct "mechanisms" or "institutional strategies" for influencing state behaviour, "normative pressure" and "membership conditionality", were used to shape policy behaviour and implementation in the aforementioned countries. Kelly circumscribes the former 'mechanism' to the sole use of "norms to persuade, shame, or praise actors into changing their policies", while the latter is characterized as "linking institutional membership to the fulfillment" of a policy recommendation (Kelley, 2005: 3) . Kelley later blurs this conceptual distinction with the use of caveats such as: "membership conditionality and socialization-based efforts [were] not mutually exclusive" (Kelley, 2004: 428) ; and the EU and the CE found "membership conditionality...a convenient extension (Kelley, 2004: 429)" to an existing mix of normative and diplomatic arguments. However, I claim, these qualifications merely soften the inherent rationalism which guided Kelley's research; despite her adroit use of 'bridge-building' language.
At first glance, Kelley's commitment to 'bi-causality' appears unquestionable. Not only does she profess a synthetic approach but further she insists that her work "...feeds into the debate about the respective role of norms and incentives, and advances beyond the either/or debate between rationalists and constructivists (Kelley, 2005: 8) ." Moreover, Kelley advises readers on how "rational-choice scholars focus on behaviour change, while socialization scholars traditionally focus on belief change. With the proper caution, it is nevertheless useful to study both mechanisms in terms of their policy effects (Kelley, 2004: 428 factor in shaping domestic policy on ethnic issues. In fact, Kelley's subsequent discussion on the practical role of 'norms' revealed an instrumentalist-as opposed to a constitutiveview. This was exemplified with her conclusion that if the change in 'payoffs' were "large enough"; policy actors were likely to change their policies and even 'rationalize' the change to their constituencies; "even if they [do] not accept the normative argument (Kelley, 2004: 431) ." Yet nowhere was it contemplated by Kelley that the very 'payoffs' referred to were nested within the broader social lure of a united 'Europe', and that this may have also contributed to the above-described 'calculations' and subsequent 'rationalization' of policy choices. In this way, what was occluded by Kelley was a consideration of the relational and cultural meaning of 'policy compliance' within the framework of 'European' accession; or to paraphrase Marshall Sahlins' argument: how the "material effects" of policy choices ultimately depend upon "their cultural encompassment (Sahlins, 1976: 194) ."
The Problem with an Incentives-Based, Model-Driven Reality
The purpose of the above criticisms however has not been to deny the analytical value of rationalist approaches to compliance politics. To the contrary, rationalist approaches can provide important heuristic insights at particular historical instances; yet the common problem with rationalist theories of compliance decision-making is their tendency to overstate and overstretch the salience of material incentives and neo-liberal bargaining for particular processes and outcomes. In this way, while conventional rationality and material forces need to be acknowledged as important explanatory factors in specific situations, where brute 'material facts' induce actors into 'cost/benefit' calculus (Checkel, 2001: 556) ; at the same time, however, what is also needed is greater appreciation of how historical and cultural contingencies make 'rationalist' reasoning practically possible at discrete times and in particular contexts.
In the context of political compliance with international rules and norms, it is reasonable to expect that rationalist approaches can explain an important part of empirical instances, either in a given situation or across a continuous period of time. Yet if decision-making in the "real social world" can almost always be located in "some intermediate spaces" (Risse, 2000: 3) between the "logic of consequentialism" and the "logic of appropriateness" (March and Olsen, 1998 & , is it prudent to assume that all cases of compliance politics are properly explained through a rationalist bargaining narrative? Further, is a model-driven approach, as implied by Schimmelfennig and Sedelmeier above, consistent with an empirically-engaged study of the compliance practices? Moreover, can complex cases such as Serbian compliance with ICTY prescriptions be explained in profound terms using a rationalist bargaining model?
In light of such reflection, this paper questions the extent to which the above-discussed theses reflect a model-driven as opposed to practical 'reality'. I make this contention expressly because the use of rational-consequentialist approaches to explain inter-state power and influence are not new. In fact, they have been the predominant approach to structural theory in IR since the Second World War, as aptly manifested by the neo-realist paradigm.
Yet, with the rise of the constructivist research programme there has also come the argument that no theory of international structure is able to "deliver a consistent and coherent reduction of action to some ultimate foundation that supposedly causes everything else (Koslowski and Kratochwil, 1994: 225) ." As Koslowski and Kratochwil explained with reference to structural realism:
"Attempts to demonstrate the superiority of material or structural causes result largely from clever historiography rather than from causal determinism. Of course ex post facto, every action can be shown to have been determined and the observer of complex patterns might be able to impute functional or evolutionary significance to certain events (1994: 225-226) ." "Norms may "guide" behaviour, they may "inspire" behaviour, they may "rationalize" or "justify" behaviour, they may express "mutual expectations" about behaviour, or they may be ignored. But they do not affect cause in the sense that a bullet through the heart causes death... (1998: 97) ."
Further, Kratochwil has noted that the influence of rules and norms on human action cannot be adequately conceptualized as an antecedent condition because rules and norms are also used to ascribe responsibility, assess praise or blame, provide reasons and excuses, and advance pleas (Kratochwil, 1984: 705) . In this way, instead of merely causing actions, rules and norms are more likely to-in the words of Jutta Weldes and Diana Saco-"make action possible (Weldes and Saco, 1996) ." Therefore, a research design which from the outset places rules and norms into the pigeonhole of antecedent causes undermines and overlooks their potential multi-dimensional contribution.
Yet again my above critique should not be construed as a wholesale rejection of material incentives. To refute the explanatory value of materialism flies in the face of rationalconsequentialist aspects (e.g. rewards and sanctions) which are embedded within various cases of compliance politics. My argument, rather, is that the parsimony of an incentivesbased and model-driven explanation, while potentially robust in terms of predicting some outcomes, runs the risk of providing only a partial explanation. Simply put, complex cases are complex because they involve a multidimensional context and process, exhibiting a constellation of material, normative and temporal factors. Any claim of profound analysis requires therefore that one explain these various dimensions which make up the gestalt of compliance politics.
Bringing Context back-in : Compliance Politics as the Study of Practice and Historical Circumstances
To this point I have argued against incentives-based, model-driven theorizing and advocated a more contextual study of compliance politics. Yet, this begs the question: how do you theorize and study context? And, moreover, should you? These are profound and difficult questions linked inherently to conflicting stances on what constitutes proper scholarly or "scientific" inquiry in the study of social and political 'reality'; a significant metatheoretical debate beyond the scope of this paper (Beyerchen, 1992 (Beyerchen, /1993 Davis, 2005; Kratochwil, 2000; Kratochwil, 2006; Kratochwil, 2007; Lebow, 2007; Stewart, 1997; Watts, 1997 Watts, /1998 ). Yet, the brief remarks which follow aim to engage with various aspects of this controversy:
as I foremost claim that we should analyze context in compliance politics, however not as monological theory but rather as a field of practice with variable realizations and meanings across time. With this assertion I attach an important caveat: the goal of this section is not to present a contextual 'theory' of compliance politics or to set out the fine-print of a contextual research programme, instead it is to provide a short outline of how a contextual approach might develop, touching upon key (meta)theoretical and methodological issues largely silenced by the environs of model-driven theorizing.
First, a more contextual understanding of compliance politics may require a profound philosophical reorientation at the very outset. To paraphrase the words of R.B.J. Walker: our philosophical premises often prefigure our concepts and theories (Walker, 1989: 178) .
Therefore, for the contingent logic of practice and context to be brought back into compliance analysis, we need to reconsider the epistemology-centred view of Cartesian science which has been the backbone of modernist social and political thought (Taylor, 1984) . In other words, we need to acknowledge the inherent limits of epistemic (universalized) theory in terms of what it can tell us about the sui generis experience of social and political practice. Simply put: for all its parsimony and elegance, we have to problematize deductive theory as practice and begin to appreciate Bourdieu's insight "that practice has a logic which is not that of logic (Bourdieu, 2005: 109) ."
The intent however is not to refute the heuristic value of deductive theories or hypotheses, or say that 'anything goes' in the realm of compliance analysis, but rather to emphasize that the practice of compliance politics is both multi-dimensional and diachronical. Such a metatheoretical stance, I claim, becomes important in the analysis of complex cases like ICTY conditionality and compliance because of what I call "thick contexts": multiple means of variable influence (e.g. incentives, normative and identity suasion) interacting in variable time with multiple decision-making dimensions (e.g. problems of interest-formation and identity framing), producing synergistic and non-linear processes that surpass the monological capacity of model-driven theory (rationalist or constructivist). It bears highlighting that model-driven theory is considerably disadvantaged when studying such multifarious scenarios because of its (1) either/or stance between material and normative structures, (2) desire to ascertain 'primary' mechanisms (Checkel, 2005) and (3) embrace of temporal abstraction (Sewell, 1996) .
Profound explanation in 'thick' contexts, I argue, cannot arise via approaches which focus on a single dimension (e.g. incentives) or articulate compliance as consisting of a priori mechanisms producing self-evident outcomes. Rather, they require a type of analysis attentive to the historical conditions which have produced compliance outcomes; an approach that recovers options made unthinkable (Taylor, 1984) by political and social practice; an inquiry which is skeptical of the alleged dichotomy between norm-governed versus strategic behaviour (March & Olsen, 1998 ; and finally, a historical stance that questions temporal abstraction, emphasizing instead the force of sequences and events upon political outcomes (Abbott, 1983 (Abbott, & 1988 Sewell 1996; Sommers, 1996) .
How might we implement this revised (meta)theoretical outlook in methodological terms? I propose that so-called process-tracing is the preferred method of inquiry. Generally speaking, process-tracing implies a close, historical study of political processes in order to reach a 'thicker' explanation of specific political outcomes. Yet, the mere mention of this method does not resolve the philosophical cleavages (metatheoretical stances) identified above: advocates of process-tracing differ on whether to use the method deductively or inductively. George and Bennett, for instance, define process-tracing with a variableoriented language common to model-driven theorizing, it: "attempts to identify the intervening causal process-the causal chain and mechanism-between an independent variable (or variables) and the outcome of the dependent variable (George and Bennett, 2005: 206) ." Davis, however, approaches process-tracing in a more diachronic manner:
"Characterizing the social world as a collection of cases understood in terms of discrete events or outcomes may lead us to overlook the wealth of historical experiences that are represented in each individual case. Although for some purposes it might make sense to conceive of cases as discrete empirical entities that permit only a single observation for measurement and coding, this is not always true. Rather, for some purposes it makes more sense to think of cases as complex phenomena, each of which comes with a history (Davis, 2005: 175) ."
The difference between the two stances is not trivial, and with growing interest in the method I expect a chasm to develop. Why? The difference articulated between Bennett and George vis-à-vis Davis touches upon a large debate located-this time-within the historical sciences on the nature of 'historicity'; or, as E.H. Carr aptly put it, the problematique of "What is History? (Carr, 1961) " For our present purposes we need not plunge into the depths of this important controversy but rather remain cognizant of it with respect to two key points. First, we need to be weary of teleological or "confirmatory" analyses of history intended to support a particular deductive theory or hypothesis (Lustick, 1996; Kratochwil, 2006: 14; see Roberts, 1996) . Second, compliance analysis should take temporality more seriously relative to causality, focusing on the very process of compliance politics, specifying its contexts across time (Sewell, 1996; Sommers, 1996) . In a nutshell, a genuine rethink is in order regarding how sequences and events fundamentally interact with material and normative structures to form particular compliance scenarios. Such reflection brings us to an important point expressed by Pierson: "that any event or process is environed by its temporal location, its place within a sequence of occurrences, and by its interactions with various processes unfolding at different speeds (Pierson, 2004: 172) ." In sum, a more temporal orientation towards the study of compliance politics means that history is far from "bunk"; and instead of viewing historical analysis as the valet of causal hypotheses, we need to pay greater attention to how material, normative and 'eventful' dimensions interact and constitute compliance outcomes across time.
Kostunica s ICTY Odyssey : A Multidimensional and Diachronic Reconstruction
In the foregoing section, therefore, I have presented an argument for a contextual approach to the study of compliance politics. In particular, I have attempted to re-articulate compliance theory and practice by questioning some of the (meta)theoretical and methodological postulates that anchor the present-day, 'scientific' study of compliance politics, such as: the epistemology-centred view of Cartesian science; the theory as practice of the epistemological model; and the primacy of causality over temporality. All these arguments come as first intimations and, indeed, further theoretical elaboration and argumentation will be required. However, as any good lawyer or even mathematician will tell you, argumentation alone cannot bring 'context' to any meaningful standing within compliance theorizing, as demonstration also plays a meaningful and persuasive role-"the proof is in the pudding" so the saying goes. Therefore in this section I turn to empirics and processtracing to address the ultimate question of "why bother?" Or, more specifically, what analytical difference would a more contextual approach make in the analysis of compliance politics?
The case of ICTY conditionality and compliance in Serbia is a useful opportunity for this purpose. Obviously, a study of Serbia alone can neither prove nor disprove the case for a contextual approach, but it can serve as an initial probe to reveal the potential value-added.
In this vein, the goal for this empirical section is rather basic: to reveal the history which is The method of process-tracing used is expectantly inductive and temporal as opposed deductive and teleological; something atypical for the compliance mainstream which has largely conflated the deductive approach with process-tracing (e.g. Schimmelfennig and Sedelmeier, Kelley) .
The objective here is to reconstruct in a "Post-Mortem" fashion the sequence of events which played out before, during and after particular extradition crises; endeavouring to uncover how material incentives, identity politics and events interacted in time to constitute compliance processes and outcomes. In this way, three hypotheses are considered in a heuristic fashion: (1) Strategic Calculation-target actors engage in cost/benefit calculations that lead them to adopt international prescriptions (Schimmelfennig and Sedelmeier, 2004 & Kelley, 2005) ; (2) Identity and Cultural Resonance-target actors operate in a culture space that defines what is a legitimate policy, action or belief (Barnett, 1999; Wiener, 2004) ; and (3)
Temporality-"the course of history [is] determined by a succession of largely contingent events (Sewell Jr., 1996) ." It bears emphasizing: these hypotheses are construed as interacting and non-linear 'dimensions' rather than as a priori 'mechanisms.' Therefore, the historical narratives which follow do not subsume historical phenomena under a universal 'covering law' of one or another hypothesis, but instead emphasize how and when a particular incentive, identity frame or event became salient in a historical sequence and how it interacted with other dimensions.
In total, the Kostunica government faced three major extradition crises (the Four Generals
Crisis; The Feasibility Study Deadline; and the Mladic Crisis), critical junctures that will guide our empirical analysis and be examined in historical sequence. considered the ICTY to be a "political" rather than a "legal" institution. 36 62 percent of Serbian citizens did not think that the extraditions of Generals Lazarevic, Lukic, Pavkovic and Djordjevic were in Serbia's "national interest." 37 Therefore, whatever medium to longrun benefits the EU could offer Serbia in exchange for ICTY compliance, Kostunica's government had to deal with the certain and calamitous risk of being labeled "unpatriotic" or working against the "national interest." After all, what made the task of ICTY cooperation so politically distasteful was the fact that most citizens viewed the indictees as military men that simply "did their jobs" on behalf of the nation. 38 If compliance were to be cast as unpatriotic, this would not only suggest electoral disaster but would also render impotent any public pressure campaign for "voluntary surrenders."
To avoid such a scenario, Kostunica's government chose to play the "patriotic card" before the generals or anybody else could. The scope of the strategy quickly became apparent once General Lazarevic broke the ice and decided to "voluntarily surrender" on January 29.
Mihajlo Bakrac, lawyer for General Lazarevic, announced the following on behalf of his client: "General Lazarevic has decided to accept his indictment…as a citizen of this country that is prepared to fulfill his duty." 39 In the days leading to Lazarevic's departure, more such messages followed, framing surrender to the ICTY as a noble act of patriotic sacrifice. On February 3, the day before Lazarevic's transfer to The Hague, the General and the Prime
Minister paid a visit to Serbian Patriarch Pavle. In a press release issued by the Serbian Orthodox Church, the General was praised:
… "Throughout our history, said the Patriarch, we have examples of honourable officers who courageously represented the interests of the people and defended the truth to the end. The Serbian Orthodox Church respects and holds in the highest regard the decision of general Lazarevic to take this difficult path in the interest of the homeland." 40 Further, that evening and as part of a final goodbye, the Mayor of Nis, Smiljko Kostic, whose party was a member of Serbia's governing coalition, held a cocktail reception in honour of General Lazarevic. In his address to the reception, Kostic paid tribute to the General as a national hero:
"I want to thank you as a great general of the Serbian army for what you have done for the nation now in peace, as you had previously in war.
[…] I want to, on behalf of the city and citizens of Nis, wish you a save journey to where, well, fate says you must go, but I believe that we will see each other again one day and that we will likely pass our pensioner days together." had reached its end with respect to Mladic. Despite a plethora of media reports and speculation, the aforementioned indictee had not only failed to surrender but there was apparently no knowledge of his whereabouts. 45 Further still, the Kostunica government was not ready to engage in harsher measures, such as arrest and forcible extradition;
notwithstanding that EU membership conditionality was at stake.
The Serbian government's hesitancy was to a considerable extent explainable on pragmatic political grounds. First, while Serbian public opinion had warmed to ICTY cooperation, such approval was largely limited to support for voluntary surrenders as a matter of pragmatic necessity. 46 Second, Mladic's prolonged flight from authority cast him as a folkhero among many on the Serbian political-right. 47 The right-wing was no political backwater: In the days that followed the suspension, the Kostunica government indicated it was prepared to take a tougher stand on Mladic. Arrests of those alleged to have sheltered the General soon came.
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Police searches publicly intensified.
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Further, in July 2006, the government presented to the EU Council of Ministers an 'action plan' for full cooperation with the ICTY; a plan which included the prompt arrest and extradition of Mladic. 53 The
Councils' reaction to the document was so positive that it even debated whether to allow negotiations to continue based on the plan alone; however in the end this came to no avail as a promise was merely given that negotiations would restart once Mladic was caught.
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Yet, what proved most interesting in this turn affairs was the framing used by the government-yet again-to justify its new arrest and extradition policy to the Serbian public.
A new equation was added to the previous frame of 'voluntary surrender means Serbian Clearly, the complex history of ICTY compliance in Serbia faces an uncertain end, with key indictees (e.g. Mladic and Karadzic) continuing to elude capture. However, the intent of the above history was not to provide a progressive historiography for the purpose of prognostication and prediction, rather the goal was far more basic: to empirically challenge the model-driven outlook of political 'reality.' In other words, to demonstrate empirically the distinction between 'modellised' theory and the complexity of political practice, so that we may reflect upon both the nature of the ICTY problem and the problematique of theory as practice in the study of compliance politics.
In this light, what should be foremost derived from this above historiography is that 'modellised' theory can be fundamentally detached from the actual practice of compliance politics. Compliance, as we have seen above, can be profoundly messy and non-linear due to an intertwining of material, normative and temporal aspects; which are contrary to 'modellised' representations "of the way things obviously are (Taylor, 1984: 17-26) ."
Complex cases, such as ICTY compliance, reveal this tension between essentialized theory and practice as they engage not only cost-benefit calculations but also fundamental conceptions of national identity and cultural meaning. By putting the particulars of the Kostunica case into focus, therefore, and returning context to the analysis of compliance outcomes, we can begin to appreciate compliance politics not in terms of stereotypical 'bargaining' versus 'arguing' schematics but as a delicate political experience profoundly influenced by variable material, normative and temporal aspects.
Indeed, one could assert, a la Schimmelfennig, Sedelmeier and Kelley, that 'dominant' or 'primary' mechanisms can be ascertained at various instances. In the above case study, this is clearly visible at particular times when a given dimension (e.g. material, normative or temporal) had a parochial-rather than ubiquitous or universal-influence over the sequence of events (see Roberts, 1996: 67) . For instance, the Kostunica government's later conversion to a 'voluntary surrender' policy in the spring of 2005 could be argued as 'proof'
that Olli Rehn's incentives 'worked'. However, having traced the sequence of events which came before, during and after the Feasibility Study deadline, we can also counter that the material incentives involved were a necessary but not sufficient condition for what transpired (see McIntyre, 1978: 196) . The added historical context revealed that Rehn's incentives did not perform as a "lever" would in mechanics, bringing about a particular effect (Ringer, 1989: 157) ." Rather, a number of dimensions (material, normative and temporal) were at 'work'
together.
This distinction, I argue, is an important one for the study compliance practices, as it reveals a priori formulations to be profoundly misleading: the experience of compliance politics is not intrinsically linked to sticks, carrots, or any other practical 'hammer'. Rather it is a politics that is inherently practical in the sense that it "deals with doing the right thing at the right time in view of particular historical circumstances (Kratochwil, 2006: 6) ." What I have tried to do with this inductive study of the Serbian case is illustrate that such a practical awareness can only come about through a sui generis understanding of historical context and its constituent dimensions; a form of thinking antithetical to monological theory and entrenched models.
Concluding Remarks Compliance Politics and the Problem of Theory as Practice
Imagine for a moment that you are professor of international politics and an eager student asks you a question related to the one addressed here: how do you explain Serbia's inconsistent pattern of compliance with ICTY conditionality? What would you answer?
Would you say that compliance politics is based on a cost/benefit calculation, stimulated by the right combination of 'carrots and sticks'? Alternatively, would you say that compliance is foremost about cultural politics and how particular conditions relate to the identity of a target actor? Or, would you assert that theories are indeed pointless and alternatively proffer an exhaustive historical account which traces events leading to various compliance outcomes? If you identified all the above answers as singularly false, and focused instead on the dimensions and processes which might have led to the questioned compliance pattern, then the chances are good that this paper made its intended impression upon your manner of compliance analysis.
In sum, this paper has challenged the tendency to generalize about patterns of compliance that fit neatly within a given model or deductive theory; while such assumptions may prove helpful in the initial stages of a research design, the inclination often meets frustration when confronted by the actual practice of complex cases such as ICTY compliance in Serbia.
Rather than shun the complexity of historical context, it is argued here, we should embrace it within our theoretical and historiographical frameworks; recognizing the inherent multidimensional and diachronic nature of compliance politics.
Inductive process-tracing of the Serbian case revealed compliance as incommensurate with a model of causal efficiency and linear effectiveness. The compliance process was complicated by the interaction of material incentives, normative concerns and contingent events; factors inherent to the making of compliance outcomes yet something which the rationalconsequentialist model 'brackets' away. To many dyed-in-the-wool 'scientists', this bracketing-or 'forgetting'-is entirely unproblematic as the identity of political and social science is firmly tied to a classical perception of scientific inquiry: scholarly investigation and theory is nothing more than a passive recording of an independent and objectified world.
Yet, a more reflexive outlook on the relationship between theory and 'reality', I argue, radically impinges upon that presumption, as the work of theorizing is more closely associated with the construction of social meaning, influencing the very actions which form political and social practice. From this perspective, the 'modellised' status quo becomes more than a 'scientific' adventure into the abstract, as the cognitive pretense to represent "the way things obviously are" links 'the model' to our exercise of political judgment: its claim 'to know' becomes the foundation for advising 'what to do' and when. Simply put, as theory produces reality, theoreticians becomes the artificers of 'reality,' and flowing from this ascription come important questions of responsibility and ethics on the manner in which we represent 'the political.' The hope of the author is that the metatheoretical and historiographical orientation of the paper has developed, to some extent, this sorely needed practical awareness within the field of compliance theory.
Notes
2 Owing to the size restriction of the article and the inductive process-tracing employed, a broader survey involving the Djindjic and Zivkovic governments was not possible here. I chose the Kostunica years because they were the most recent and best encapsulated incidents of Serbian compliance and noncompliance. One of the drawbacks with the aforementioned time period is that it revolved largely around EU incentives and therefore there was relatively little US involvementwhich is in contrast to the earlier mentioned governments. However, my current PhD. research is a broader survey, looking at ICTY (non)compliance in both Serbia and Croatia. This article, therefore, serves as an introduction to the complex politics and controversy which has surrounded ICTY conditionality and compliance in the former Yugoslavia.
3 For a useful discussion of the Humean desire/belief dichotomy, see Alexander Wendt, Social Theory, [34] [35] 
